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VI. The Polish Ordinary Courts 




Polish ordinary courts1 adjudicate in areas of criminal law and civil law, includ-
ing labour and social security law. The right to a fair trial requires that the case 
is verified by at least two court instances2 and this rule is preserved both by civ-
il and criminal procedure.3 In strictly defined matters a case can be resolved by 
the Polish Supreme Court, which acts as a court of cassation. It must be noted that 
Polish law does not classify the Supreme Court as a part of the ordinary courts sys-
tem.4 However, due to the value of its judgments for the ordinary courts we shall 
consider it as such. 
Polish courts issue judgments on the basis of Polish law, which encompasses 
also public international law. Pursuant to Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution, the Re-
public of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it. Ratified interna-
tional agreements are one of the sources of a universally binding law of the Repub-
lic of Poland (Art. 87(1) of the Constitution). They constitute part of the domestic 
* Dr iur., Assistant Professor, Department of  European Constitutional Law, Faculty of  Law 
and Administration, University of Lodz, Poland.
1 In  Poland there are  at present 321 district courts, 45 provincial courts and  11 appellate 
courts, Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Lista sądów powszechnych’, <https://bip.ms.gov.pl/
pl/rejestry-i-ewidencje/lista-sadow-powszechnych/> (access: 21 November 2015).
2 Arts. 45(1) and 175(1) of the Polish Constitution. 
3 Art. 367(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 425(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4 Art.  175(1) of  the Polish Constitution, Art.  2(1) of  the Code of  Civil Procedure, Arts. 24–27 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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legal order and shall be applied directly after their promulgation in  the Journal 
of Laws of  the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw), unless their application de-
pends on the enactment of a statute (Art. 91(1) of the Constitution). An interna-
tional agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by a statute shall have prece-
dence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions 
of these statutes (Art. 91(2) of the Constitution). Since the entry into force of the 
Polish Constitution international law, at least in theory, is quite broadly applied by 
Polish courts. The aim of this paper is to show whether when this happens courts 
use the expertise of international and foreign courts or even enter into the conver-
sation with the judges from other jurisdictions. 
A wide understanding of the notion of judicial dialogue has been adopted for 
the purposes of this study. The notion will denote here any referral made by Polish 
ordinary courts to decisions of other jurisdictions. In order to answer the posed 
research question, the  following screening method was applied. Courts’ rulings 
are in Poland published in Internet databases. These databases were searched with 
the use of selected keywords, for example: ‘international’, ‘custom’, ‘convention’, ‘tri-
bunal’, to find the relevant case law. They were then analysed with the view of iden-
tifying instances of dialogue and classified accordingly. 
Having collected the  research material, it was noticeable that the  decisions 
from other jurisdictions that are the most frequently mentioned by Polish courts 
are these of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (CJEU). Both the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and EU law form a part of the Polish law and they are often di-
rectly applicable by the courts. The judgments of these two jurisdictions are wide-
spread, many of them are available in Polish and are broadly commented by Polish 
scholars. Due to a great quantity of the judgments referring to the decisions of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU, the scope of the research was limited only to those deliv-
ered in years 2010–2015. The referrals to the decisions of the other international 
bodies, e.g. the  United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) or the  Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) or courts of other States were occasional. There-
fore, they were examined in a more detailed manner and no time limits applied. 
The  study does not deal with the procedural references to the decisions of  for-
eign courts where the application of foreign law ensues from the obligation based, 
e.g. on the Regulation 593/20085 or international private law.6 
5 Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to contrac-
tual obligations (Rome I) (2008) O.J. L 177/6.
6 As an example of this type of judgments we may present the judgment in Case IV CSK 309/12 
(Supreme Court, 8 February 2013), in which the Court referred to the judgments of the German 
courts on the interpretation of the rules of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch on the compensation 
for traffic accidents, which the Court had to apply on the basis of the Hague Convention on 
the law applicable to traffic accidents of 4 May 1971. The courts, on the basis of Art. 1143(3) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, asked the Ministry of Justice for the explanation of the foreign 
legal practice.
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As it has been pointed out already in  this volume by M. Górski, the  judicial 
dialogue may be classified vis-à-vis the criterion of appropriateness. The dialogue 
can be proper, fake or decorative and, eventually, failed.7 We will explore the exam-
ples from all these categories, yet the main focus will be to identify the examples 
of proper dialogue. By doing so we would like to show the participation of Pol-
ish ordinary courts in the development of international law, in the strengthening 
the rule of law or searching for common judicial standards. 
2. Examples of a Proper Dialogue
The aim of  this part of  the paper is  to present decisions of  Polish courts, 
in  which they enter into proper dialogue with international and  foreign bod-
ies. A proper dialogue means courts’ rulings “referring to accurately collected 
case law of  other courts and  analysing it properly from methodological point 
of view.”8 
The research revealed four main substantive law categories where such dia-
logue appears. Polish courts refer to the  decisions of  international and  foreign 
courts mainly in  cases concerning human rights, EU law and  customary inter-
national law. The fourth group covers every other area of law in which the courts 
enter into dialogue on international law. 
2.1. Human Rights Protection
The first area, in which Polish ordinary courts enter into a dialogue with in-
ternational bodies, is  the field of  human rights protection. Poland is  a  party to 
numerous human rights treaties and these rights form an essential element of the 
Polish legal system.
 The substantial part of the dialogue is made up of references of the courts to 
the decisions of the ECtHR. This range of cases will be addressed only very brief-
ly, as it is a topic of a more detailed analysis made in this volume by M. Górski.9 
It seems sufficient to indicate that ordinary courts are acquainted with the judg-
ments of  the ECtHR. Many decisions of  the Court, especially those rendered 
7 See the contribution to this volume: M. Górski, Dialogue between national courts of selected 




against Poland, are translated into Polish and they are published on the websites 
of the Ministry of Justice10 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.11 
The decisions of the ECtHR are mentioned by ordinary courts mostly in the 
following areas: the  right to a  fair trial,12 the  obligation of  a  State to protect 
the personal goods of  the arrested and  the imprisoned persons whilst ensuring 
appropriate conditions of their imprisonment,13 the use of the provocation in the 
criminal procedure,14 the freedom of speech,15 the compensation for the arbitrary 
arrest.16 In all cases ECtHR judgments are generally invoked to support the courts’ 
own reasoning.
As an example of a proper judicial dialogue we shall discuss a  judgment de-
livered by the Wroclaw District Court in X P 384/13.17 The case concerned disci-
plinary sanction imposed on a school teacher (the plaintiff) who during the staff 
meeting criticised the  behaviour of  the school director. The  plaintiff opposed 
to the fact that the director announced the results of the teachers’ evaluation by 
the students in public during the meeting, but instead should have done so in pri-
vate with every teacher. The plaintiff, in the view of the director, questioned his 
competences and  depreciated his authority. As a  result, the  director punished 
the plaintiff giving her a caution.18 
The plaintiff argued before the  court that the  penalty violated her freedom 
of speech, as enshrined in Art. 54 of the Polish Constitution and in Art. 10 ECHR. 
To solve the  case, the  Wroclaw District Court referred to numerous judgments 
of the ECtHR on Art. 10 ECHR, especially in relations between employee and em-
ployer, in order to establish a standard of protection of this right, which is common 
for the European States. 
At the beginning it was necessary to establish the attribution of protection 
under Art.  10 ECHR. The  first judgment mentioned by the  Wroclaw District 
10 Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Orzecznictwo Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’, 
<https://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/prawa-czlowieka/europejski-trybunal-praw-czlowieka/orzec-
znictwo-europejskiego-trybunalu-praw-czlowieka/> (access: 2 October 2015).
11 Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Nowe tłumaczenia wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
Człowieka na  język polski’, <https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/europejski_
trybunal_praw_czlowieka/aktualnosci/nowe_tlumaczenia_wyrokow_europejskiego_trybu-
nalu_praw_czlowieka_na_jezyk_polski> (access: 2 October 2015).
12 Supreme Court cases: III CZP 16/10 (30 November 2010); III KK 327/12 (5 April 2013); I KZP 
14/14 (26 June 2014); I PZ 19/14 (28 October 2014); case II AKz 340/10 (Wroclaw Appellate 
Court, 17 June 2010). 
13 Case III CZP 25/11 (Supreme Court, 18 October 2011); case I ACa 758/12 (Szczecin Appellate 
Court, 20 December 2012); case I ACa 966/12 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 31 January 2013). 
14 Supreme Court cases: III KK 152/10 (30 November 2010); II KK 265/13 (19 March 2014).
15 Case I ACa 662/12 (Łódź Appellate Court, 1 October 2012); case II AKa 91/11 (Lublin Appellate 
Court, 6 June 2011); case I ACa 201/12 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 20 September 2012).
16 Case II KK 296/11 (Supreme Court, 13 June 2012).
17 Case X P 384/13 (Wroclaw District Court, 7 June 2013).
18 In Polish: upomnienie.
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Court was a 2009 Wojtas-Kaleta v Poland19 where the application was filed by 
a  journalist of  the Polish Public Television (TVP S.A.). The  applicant as well 
as many other journalists and artists signed an open protest letter directed to 
the Board of TVP S.A. criticizing the reduction in the number of cultural pro-
grams to the favour of purely commercial ones. The ECtHR found that the rep-
rimand penalty20 imposed on the applicant was in conflict with Art. 10 ECHR, 
especially taking into consideration the  fact that the  applicant’s critique was 
done in good faith and it was not directed against any specific person but only 
against the employer’s policy. In 2013 decision the Wroclaw District Court found 
the situation in Wojtas-Kaleta v Poland analogous to the one before it. It empha-
sized that the plaintiff was not acting mala fides against the director or any other 
teacher, but presented a general opinion that the results should be discussed with 
everyone in private.
Further the  Wroclaw District Court referred to the  decision in  Sosinowska 
v  Poland,21 in  which the  applicant, a  medical doctor, criticized the  work of  her 
colleague and his improper treatment of patients. The ECtHR found that the ab-
solute prohibition of critique of one doctor directed at the work of another is con-
trary to Art. 10 ECHR, especially if the critique is induced by the care for patients’ 
health. In the case at stake, the Wroclaw District Court found that the plaintiff ’s 
action was only a defence of her colleague, who was criticized in public and, there-
fore, at risk of ostracism by other teachers.
Another case mentioned by the  Wroclaw District Court was Fuentes Bobo 
v  Spain,22 concerning offensive opinions of  the applicant against his employer 
(public television). As a  result of pronouncement of his opinions, the applicant 
was dismissed, which was found by the ECtHR to be an excessive and dispropor-
tionate sanction. Before the  incident, the applicant had been for many years an 
appreciated employee. 
Having established, that the case at stake falls under the realm of Art. 10 ECHR, 
it was indispensable to analyse the  principle of  proportionality of  intervention. 
The Wroclaw District Court found that not every expression of opinion is pro-
tected by Art. 10 ECHR and it may happen that a sanction imposed on an em-
ployee is proportionate. As example it pointed out the ruling of the ECtHR in Pal-
omo Sanchez and others v Spain.23 The applicants published a magazine, in which 
they used vulgar language and  pictures criticizing their colleagues for giving 
in court a testimony favourable to their employer. All applicants were dismissed 
from their work and the ECtHR did not found this sanction excessive. Moreover, 
the Wroclaw District Court notices, that the ECtHR cited the advisory opinion 
19 Wojtas-Kaleta v Poland, App. no. 20436/02 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009).
20 In Polish: nagana.
21 Sosinowska v Poland, App. no. 10247/09 (ECtHR, 18 October 2011).
22 Fuentes Bobo v Spain, App. no. 39293/98 (ECtHR, 29 February 2000).
23 Palomo Sanchez and others v Spain, App. no. 28955/06 (ECtHR, 12 September 2011).
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of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in OC-5/8524 declaring 
that freedom of speech is a necessary condition of development of trade unions. 
It resulted thereof that the freedom of expression is also guaranteed to employees, 
who thus have the  right to criticize their employers, despite subordination that 
exists in their relations.
On the  basis of  these opinions the  Wroclaw District Court concluded, that 
the plaintiff ’s behaviour could not be regarded as exceeding the  freedom of ex-
pression. Furthermore, referring to Jersild v  Denmark25 and  Nilsen and  Johnsen 
v Norway26 the Court emphasized that
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society 
and  one of  the basic conditions for its progress and  for each individual’s self-fulfillment. 
Within the limitations of paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ 
or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, toler-
ance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Ar-
ticle 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, 
and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly.27
On that ground the Wroclaw District Court found that there was no reason to 
impose a penalty on the plaintiff.
The decision of the Wroclaw District Court should be considered as an exem-
plary proper judicial dialogue. The Court not only cited the opinions of the ECtHR 
but also showed their relation to the subject matter of the case before the District 
Court. The Court compared the factual background of the cases before the ECt HR 
and  the outcome of  the ECtHR’s deliberations with the  facts of  the case before 
the  District Court and  on this basis drew conclusions as to the  required level 
of protection of  freedom of speech and the appropriateness of  the sanction im-
posed on the plaintiff by her employer. An additional value of this judgment pre-
sents itself in an indirect dialogue of the Wroclaw District Court with the IACtHR, 
where the ECtHR played a role of an intermediary.
24 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, 
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-American Court of  Human Rights Series A  No. 5 (13 No-
vember 1985): “70. Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence 
of  a  democratic society rests. It  is indispensable for the  formation of  public opinion. It  is 
also a conditio sine qua non for the development of political parties, trade unions, scientific 
and cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to influence the public. It represents, 
in short, the means that enable the community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently 
informed. Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is not a society 
that is truly free.”
25 Jersild v Denmark, App. no. 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23 September 1994).
26 Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway, App. no. 23118/93 (ECtHR, 25 November 1999).
27 Ibidem, 43.
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Another international body, whose opinions on human rights had some, albeit 
limited, influence on decisions of ordinary courts is the Human Rights Commit-
tee. The HRC’s case-law is mentioned very rarely, it seems that not many judges 
are familiar with the Committee’s activity. 
In I CSK 439/1328 the Supreme Court examined in opinion an opinion of the 
HRC. The case before the Court concerned a Sikh, Mr. S.P., who was forced by 
the Border Guards to remove his turban during the customs control. He claimed 
damages for a breach of his personal interests under the Polish Civil Code29 and the 
freedom of religion.
 Firstly, the  Supreme Court invoked and  analysed several of  its own judg-
ments and the case-law of the ECtHR. The Court referred to X v United King-
dom,30 in which the applicant was also a Sikh who was fined by the British Police 
due to his riding a motorcycle without a crash helmet, which was required by 
British law. His application to the ECtHR was rejected by the European Com-
mission for Human Rights as it noticed that the compulsory wearing of crash 
helmets is  a  necessary safety measure for motorcyclists. Therefore, the  inter-
ference with the applicant’s freedom of religion was justified by the protection 
of health. Then the Supreme Court cited the ruling in Phull v France,31 in which 
the factual background was similar to the one in the case at stake. The applicant, 
who was a practising Sikh, was compelled by the security staff at the airport to 
remove his turban for inspection as he made his way through the security check-
point prior to entering the  departure lounge. The  ECtHR found no violation 
of the ECHR and emphasized that security checks at the airports are undoubt-
edly necessary in the interests of public safety, particularly as the measure was 
only resorted to occasionally.
Moreover, the  Court made a  comparison of  the judgment of  the ECtHR 
in Mann Singh v France32 and the opinion of the HRC in Mann Singh v France.33 
The  Supreme Court studied in  detail the  decisions of  these two instances 
on the  prohibition of  wearing a  turban while taking a  photo for a  passport 
and  a  driving licence, as in  the case of  the same person the  ECtHR and  the 
HRC have issued contrary decisions. The ECtHR has not found any violation 
of the ECHR, emphasizing that a requirement of removing a turban for the pur-
pose of  taking a photo for a driving licence and an identity card is necessary 
in a democratic society on the grounds of public safety as it reduces the  risk 
of  fraud from tampering permits lead, and  therefore it falls into the  margin 
of appreciation granted to State. The HRC, on the contrary, found that there was 
a breach of the applicant’s right to freedom of religion. According to the HRC, 
28 Case I CSK 439/13 (Supreme Court, 17 September 2014).
29 Arts. 23 and 24 of the Civil Code.
30 X v United Kingdom, App. no. 7992/77 (European Commission for Human Rights, 12 July 1978).
31 Phull v France, App. no. 35753/03 (ECtHR, 11 January 2005).
32 Mann Singh v France, App. no. 24479/07 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008).
33 Mann Singh v France, App. no. 1928/2010 (HRC, 19 July 2013).
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France has not proven how taking off a turban for purposes of taking a photo 
would make the identification of the claimant more possible, as in everyday life 
he wears a  turban in a way, which makes his face perfectly visible. The HRC 
claimed that the sustained character of the violation caused by the State’s refusal 
to issue requested documents was contrary to the  principle of  proportional-
ity. The  Supreme Court emphasized that the  situation of  the plaintiff in  the 
case at stake, Mr. S.P., was different from the one of Mr. Mann Singh. It con-
cerned the safety of the passengers and the flight and it was a singular and an 
exceptional interference in Mr. S.P.’s freedom of religion, whereas the intrusion 
in the rights of Mr. Mann Singh was of a permanent and a long lasting character, 
as he could not obtain important documents for several years due to the lack 
of a photo.34 
The analysis of the opinions of the ECtHR and the HRC permitted the Supreme 
Court to make a conclusion that there was no violation of human rights of Mr. S.P. 
There was an intrusion with the plaintiff ’s personal rights and freedom of religion, 
but it was necessary in a democratic society and neither was it disproportionate, as 
the obligation to remove the turban was imposed only occasionally.  
As it may be noticed, in the area of human rights protection ordinary courts re-
fer to opinions of different international bodies. In that sphere, the most developed 
dialogue exists with the ECtHR, as the research revealed only one example of a di-
alogue with the HRC. As we may see from the examples presented above, Polish 
courts resort to a detailed analysis of decision of other courts to find a common 
standard of protection of human rights and apply it in cases before them.
2.2. Customary International Law
One of the most natural areas of dialogue with international and foreign courts 
is the area of customary international law. The major subject in this area is State 
immunity. In the 2010 Natoniewski35 case the Polish Supreme Court was to decide 
whether the Federal Republic of Germany is protected by State immunity in cases 
concerning the damages caused during the World War II. The plaintiff, Mr. Na-
toniewski, claimed damages (a sum of 1 000 000 PLN) as a compensation for the in-
juries36 suffered during the  pacification of  Szczecin carried out by the  German 
34 “W motywach opinii wskazano, że co prawda państwo może powoływać się na ochronę po-
rządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego, w tym na przeciwdziałanie fałszerstwu dokumentów 
i tożsamości, jednak skarżone państwo nie wykazało, że dopuszczenie fotografii w turbanie 
naruszałoby interes ogólny, skoro posiadacz zawsze występuje publicznie ubrany w ten spo-
sób. […] Wreszcie zastosowanie środka było jedynie okazjonalne (inaczej niż w powołanej 
wyżej sprawie Mann Singh) i  obiektywnie nie przyniosło powodowi uszczerbku, ponieważ 
badanie zawsze odbywało się w osobnym pomieszczeniu, tylko w obecności funkcjonariusza 
prowadzącego kontrolę. Zastosowany środek był zatem proporcjonalny.”
35 Case IV CSK 465/09 (Supreme Court, 29 October 2010).
36 The plaintiff was a 6-year-old child. His head, chest, hands were burned. 
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army on 2 February 1944. Mr. Natoniewski claimed that there was no possibility to 
apply State immunity when the State breached jus cogens norm. There is a notice-
able trend in public international law to indicate that in case of conflict between 
jus cogens norm and State immunity, a peremptory norm is superior and deprives 
the rule of State immunity of all its legal effects.37 Natoniewski gave thus the Su-
preme Court a possibility to participate in international legal discussion on the re-
lationship between the two norms.
To determine whether Germany could be sued before Polish courts the Court 
carefully considered many international and national courts decisions. At the be-
ginning the Supreme Court distinguished between two groups of judgments pre-
senting two different views. According to the  first approach, the  jurisdictional 
immunity of State has still an absolute character, whereas, according to the sec-
ond one, certain restrictions may apply. Apart from the referrals to the judgments 
of  the ECtHR38 and  the CJEU,39 the  Court examined the  judgment of  the ICJ 
of 2002 in Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium.40 For the Polish Supreme 
Court the ICJ judgment was an example of a decision adopting the first of the 
above mentioned views. In this case the ICJ held that even the breach of jus co-
gens would not enable the abolition of the immunity of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Congo while in office. At the time when the ICJ issued its ruling, 
there was a  broad discussion on immunity of  State officials in  case of  serious 
crimes under international law. The House of Lords in Pinochet41 and the French 
Cour de Cassation in Qaddafi42 decided that in this situation, a State official is not 
protected by immunity. However, the Polish Supreme Court in its decision in Na-
toniewski did not make any distinction between immunity of State and that of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Upon a broad inquiry into the decisions from other 
jurisdictions, the Court also indicated, that even if there is a tendency in inter-
national law to exclude the State immunity in case of a serious breach of human 
rights law, the ICJ would need to make a pronouncement on the Jurisdictional 
37 Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001), joint dissent-
ing opinion of judges Rozakis and Caflish, joined by judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto 
and Vajić. 
38 Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001); McElhinney 
v Ireland, App. no. 31253/96 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001); Kalogeropoulou and others v Greece 
and Germany, App. no. 59021/00 (ECtHR, 12 December 2002); Waite and Kennedy v Germany, 
App. no. 26083/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
39 C-292/05 Erini Lechouritou and others v Dimosio tis Demokratias tis Germanias (CJEU, 15 Feb-
ruary 2007); C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v  Hans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann and  Stefan 
Waidmann (CJEU, 21 April 1993).
40 Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Bel-
gium) (ICJ, 14 February 2002).
41 Commissioner of  Police for the  Metropolis and  Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (House of  Lords, 
24 March 1999).
42 Case 00–87215 Qaddafi (French Cour de Cassation, 13 March 2001).
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Immunities of  the State (Germany v  Italy: Greece Intervening) case43 that was at 
the time pending.
The Supreme Court examined there also numerous decisions of  the courts 
of other States, i.a. of: the United Kingdom,44 the United States,45 Italy46 and Greece.47 
It was part of the Court’s research into international custom on jurisdictional im-
munity of States and definitely it is worth an approval that the Court did not limit 
the scope of its examination only to international bodies, but it made a detailed 
scrutiny of various foreign courts’ case law. In cases concerning the determina-
tion of an existence or a lack of a customary international law, it is indispensable 
that the courts of different States study opinions of other courts on both, national 
and international level.
The Supreme Court decided, that the  Polish judicial practice acknowledges 
State jurisdictional immunity as a part of international customary law and is ap-
plicable by national courts on the basis of Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution. The im-
munity has its source in the principle of equality of States (par in parem non habet 
imperium) and it is an expression of State sovereignty. Its aim is to preserve friend-
ly inter-State relationships.48 The Court, referring to its own previous decisions,49 
indicated that till 1950’s State immunity was absolute in every aspect, but nowa-
days this absolute character is connected only with a sovereign activity of a State 
(acta iure imperii), whereas a State is not entitled to it when a dispute arises from 
a commercial transaction entered into by a State or other non-sovereign activity 
of State (acta iure gestionis).
43 Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Germany v  Italy: Greece intervening) (ICJ, 3 February 
2012).
44 Jones v Saudi Arabia (House of Lords, 14 June 2006).
45 Liu v Republic of China (United States Court of Appeals, 9 Circuit, 29 December 1989); Repub-
lic of Austria v Maria Altmann (United States Supreme Court, 7 June 2004); Guy von Dardel 
v the USSR (United States DC Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 October 1985).
46 Ferrini v Germany 5044/2004 (Italian Corte di Cassazione, 11 March 2004); Civitella 1072/08 
(Italian Corte di Cassazione, 21 October 2008).
47 Perfectory Voiotia v Germany (Distomo) 111/2000 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 4 May 2000); 
Margellos v Germany 6/2002 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 17 September 2002).
48 The  Supreme Court in  Natoniewski stated that: “Ostatecznie w  polskim orzecznictwie 
pod wpływem wypowiedzi piśmiennictwa przeważył pogląd uznający na gruncie art. 9 Kon-
stytucji za  źródło tego immunitetu powszechnie przyjęty zwyczaj międzynarodowy. […] 
U podstaw immunitetu jurysdykcyjnego państw obcych leży zasada równości państw (par 
in parem non habet imperium). Jest on wyrazem poszanowania suwerenności państw. Zmie-
rza do utrzymania między państwami przyjaznych stosunków.”
“Finally, the Polish jurisprudence decided that on the basis of Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution 
it is the commonly accepted international custom that is the source of this immunity. […] 
The basis of the jurisdictional immunity of foreign States is the principle of equality of States 
(par in parem non habet imperium). It is the expression of the respect to the State sovereignty. 
It aims at keeping friendly inter-State relationships” (transl. by the author).
49 Supreme Court cases: III PZP 9/90 (26 September 1990); III CSK 293/07 (13 March 2008).
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court noticed on the basis of the detailed in-
formation supplied by the Ministry of Justice that whenever States regulated State 
immunity, State jurisdictional immunity is  excluded in  cases of  injury or dam-
age occurred in  the territory of State of  the forum. The same rule was adopted 
in the European Convention on State immunity.50 There are also judicial decisions, 
which accept this rule,51 but there exist also such that contradict it.52 However, 
even if a new rule of customary international law has been recently created and it 
permits claiming damages from a State for injuries it caused and which occurred 
in the territory of State of the forum, it does not mean, in the view of the Supreme 
Court, that it can be applied to the events that took place decades ago.53
Moreover, jurisdictional State immunity concerns especially the  actions that 
occurred during the time of war or armed conflict and cannot be upheld by such 
recently created exception. The questions of  injuries or damages are  then regu-
lated by peace treaties between sovereign States. In relations between individuals 
and States jurisdictional immunity is granted. 
The Supreme Court noticed also that some foreign courts present a view, that 
jurisdictional State immunity is excluded in case of breach of jus cogens norms, as 
it means that a State impliedly renounces its immunity.54 Yet the Court underlined 
that in its opinion State may expressly relinquish its immunity, but the renounce-
ment cannot be implied and  it does not belong to a national court to interpret 
international law in a way unaccepted by other States, and the jus cogens exception 
is not commonly recognized.55 Moreover, the  jus cogens norms concerned (pro-
50 European Convention on State Immunity (adopted on 16 February 1972, Basel). Art.  11: 
“A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Con-
tracting State in proceedings which relate to redress for injury to the person or damage to 
tangible property, if the facts which occasioned the injury or damage occurred in the territory 
of the State of the forum, and if the author of the injury or damage was present in that terri-
tory at the time when those facts occurred.”
51 Liu v Republic of China (United States Court of Appeals, 9 Circuit, 29 December 1989); Perfec-
tory Voiotia v Germany (Distomo) 111/2000 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 4 May 2000); Fer-
rini v Germany 5044/2004 (Italian Corte di Cassazione, 11 March 2004); Hugo Princz v Federal 
Republic of Germany (United States DC Circuit Court of Appeals, 14 April 2003); Hirsch v State 
of Israel and State of Germany (United States District Court (New York), 8 April 1997); Bruce 
Smith v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (United States Court of Appeals, 2 Circuit, 
26 November 1996).
52 Margellos v  Germany 6/2002 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 17 September 2002); Jones 
v Saudi Arabia (House of Lords, 14 June 2006).
53 Republic of Austria v Maria Altmann (United States Supreme Court, 7 June 2004).
54 Liu v Republic of China (United States Court of Appeals, 9 Circuit, 29 December 1989); Guy von 
Dardel v the USSR (DC Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 October 1985); Perfectory Voiotia v Germany 
(Distomo) 111/2000 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 4 May 2000); Ferrini v Germany 5044/2004 
(Italian Corte di Cassazione, 11 March 2004); Civitella 1072/08 (Italian Corte di Cassazione, 
21 October 2008).
55 Hugo Princz v Federal Republic of Germany (DC Circuit Court of Appeals, 14 April 2003); Hirsch 
v State of Israel and State of Germany (United States District Court (New York), 8 April 1997); 
Bruce Smith v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 95–7930, 95–7931, 95–7942 (United 
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hibition of torture, prohibition of genocide) have substantive character, whereas 
jurisdictional State immunity is of procedural nature so they cannot reciprocally 
influence one another.
It is worth underlining that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Natoniewski was 
noticed and had an impact on international level, as it was referred to by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in its decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening)56 and by the European Court of Human Rights 
in Jones and Others v the United Kingdom.57 The ICJ’s ruling concerned the respon-
sibility of Germany for damages caused during World War II, so the circumstances 
were exactly the same as in Natoniewski. First, agreeing with the Polish Supreme 
Court, the ICJ noticed, that the Basel Convention58 does not cover the immunity 
of a State for the acts of its armed forces. Then the ICJ described in detail the rea-
sons, why the  Polish Court decided that Germany had jurisdictional immunity 
in cases on the acts committed during World War II and mentioned, that the Pol-
ish Supreme Court was one of the bodies presenting opinion that State immunity 
does not depend on the gravity of the act of which it is accused or the peremptory 
nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated.
The judgment of the ECtHR concerned the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR). 
The applicants claimed they had been tortured in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
by its officials and brought civil claims before the courts of the United Kingdom. 
The  claims were dismissed, as the  courts decided in  favour of  State immunity, 
which was granted to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its officials even in the 
case of an alleged breach of the jus cogens norm, namely the prohibition of tor-
ture. The ECtHR was provided by the applicants and the United Kingdom with 
a comparative material on the practice of 21 Members of the Council of Europe 
and many other States worldwide in the area of State immunity. The information 
presented contained also the  decision in  Natoniewski. For the  European Court 
of Human Rights the decisive factor was however the judgment of the Internation-
al Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece 
Intervening).
The above-mentioned cases prove, that where important issues of international 
law are concerned the dialogue between different courts is multilateral and one 
can observe an interaction, what has positive influence on development of inter-
national customary law.  
States 2 Circuit Court of Appeals, 26 November 1996); Jones v Saudi Arabia (House of Lords, 
14 June 2006); Al-Adsani v  the  United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 
2001); McElhinney v  Ireland, App. no. 31253/96 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001); Kalogeropou-
lou and others v Greece and Germany, App. no. 59021/00 (ECtHR, 12 December 2002); Waite 
and Kennedy v Germany, App. no. 26083/94 (ECtHR, 18 February1999).
56 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (n. 44).
57 Jones and Others v the United Kingdom, App. nos 34356/06 and 40528/06 (ECtHR, 14 January 
2014).
58 European Convention on State immunity (adopted on 16 May 1972 in Basel).
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The other example of Polish cases on State immunity which had a considera-
ble impact internationally concerns immunity from enforcement. The former em-
ployee of the Nigerian Embassy in Poland wanted to institute the enforcement pro-
ceedings against her employer and required reinstitution and imposition of fine.59 
Basing on the ICJ’s judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of  the State (Germany 
v  Italy: Greece Intervening), the  Provincial Court emphasized that State immu-
nity in  the enforcement proceedings is  wider than the  jurisdictional immunity. 
A  mere fact that there has been a  final judgment delivered by a  national court 
against a State does not mean that the enforcement proceedings can be institut-
ed against that State on such basis. The international custom on immunity from 
jurisdiction and the immunity from enforcement differs as each of them has its’ 
separate prerequisites. For the enforcement proceedings against other State’s prop-
erty it has to be ascertained that the property is used for the purposes other than 
non-commercial government actions or the State has expressly agreed to the appli-
cation of the enforcement proceedings to a given property, or the State has indicat-
ed a property that can be the object of the enforcement proceedings.60
The Warsaw Provincial Court referred as well to the judgments of the courts 
of  other States. One of  them was the  1977 landmark decision of  the German 
59 Case XXI Pz 95/14 (Warsaw Provincial Court, 26 June 2014).
60 “W tym miejscu na szczególną uwagę zasługuje wyrok Międzynarodowego Trybunału Spra-
wiedliwości z dnia 3 lutego 2012 r. w sprawie Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening – jurisdic-
tional immunities of  the State, w  którym Trybunał wskazał, że immunitet chroniący przed 
środkami przymusu własność państwa znajdującą  się na  terytorium obcego państwa jest 
szerszy niż immunitet jurysdykcyjny. Z  faktu wydania wyroku przeciwko obcemu państwu 
nie wynika ipso facto, że państwo to może być podmiotem środków przymusu na terytorium 
państwa forum w celu wykonania wydanego wyroku – normy zwyczajowego prawa między-
narodowego odnoszące się do immunitetu egzekucyjnego i immunitetu jurysdykcyjnego są 
więc różne i  muszą być oddzielnie stosowane. Trybunał sformułował także warunki, które 
muszą być spełnione, aby środek przymusu mógł być zastosowany przeciwko mieniu nale-
żącemu do  państwa obcego: mienie to musi być wykorzystywane do  działań niesłużących 
celom rządowym o charakterze niekomercyjnym lub państwo to wyraźnie zgodziło się na za-
stosowanie środka przymusu lub wskazało mienie, o  które chodzi dla  celów zaspokojenia 
roszczenia prawnego.” 
“Here a special attention should be given to the judgment of the International Court of Jus-
tice of 3 February 2012 in case Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening – jurisdictional immunities 
of State, in which the Court indicated that the immunity protecting from coercive measures 
a State property placed on a territory of other State is broader than jurisdictional immuni-
ty. It does not result ipso facto from a mere fact of giving a judgment against foreign State, 
that a  State can be an object of  coercive measures on a  territory of  a  foreign State in  the 
aim of the execution of a given ruling – the rules of international customary law on immu-
nity from enforcement proceedings and jurisdictional immunity are thus different and they 
should be applied separately. The  Court has also elaborated conditions, which should be 
fulfilled, if the coercive measure against the property of other State is to be applied: the prop-
erty should not be used for governmental purposes of non-commercial character or the State 
has expressly agreed for the application of coercive measure or has designated property that 
can be used for the satisfaction of a legal claim” (transl. by the author).
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Constitutional Court in Philippine Embassy,61 in which the German Court stated 
inter alia that the receivables from a current ordinary bank account of an em-
bassy of a foreign State existing in the forum State and intended to cover the em-
bassy’s expenses and  costs are  not subject to execution by the  forum State.62 
The  Warsaw Court invoked also the  judgments, in  which the  courts of  other 
States decided that the bank accounts used by a foreign State only for the com-
mercial transactions purposes do not have the privilege of immunity from en-
forcement proceedings.63 
On the  basis of  these judgments the  Warsaw Provincial Court ordered 
the District Court for the capital city of Warsaw to ascertain, whether the en-
forcement proceedings on the reinstitution could be instituted against the Ni-
gerian Embassy. A separate analysis should concern the possibility of the im-
position of  a  fine, especially taking into account that it may encroach upon 
the principle of equal sovereignty of States. As the reinstitution belongs to labor 
law, and thus forms a part of acta de iure gestionis, the fine is a repressive meas-
ure, so the defendant in the case at stake might remain protected by the immu-
nity from enforcement.
Deciding on the  existence of  a  norm of  customary international law and  its 
scope requires referring to decisions of international and foreign courts. The above 
mentioned examples of proper judicial dialogue, although scarce, show that ordi-
nary courts can carry on a detailed scrutiny of opinions of other bodies and on 
that basis draw their own conclusions that are noticed on the international level, as 
the example of Natoniewski shows.
2.3. Application of EU Law
The dialogue on EU law between ordinary courts and the CJEU occurs much 
more often and it is of a different scope and character, due to the role that EU law 
plays in the national law of the EU Member State. The dialogue between Polish or-
dinary courts and the CJEU occurs usually through the procedure of preliminary 
rulings, what is described in this volume by A. Czaplińska.64
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this contribution it is worth to mention oth-
er examples of  the references to EU law. The Warsaw Appellate Court in I ACa 
61 Case 2 BvM 1/76 (German Constitutional Court, 13 December 1977).
62 “Forderungen aus einem laufenden, allgemeinen Bankkonto der Botschaft eines frem-
den Staates, das im Gerichtsstaat besteht und zur Deckung der Ausgaben und Kosten der 
Botschaft bestimmt ist, unterliegen nicht der Zwangsvollstreckung durch den Gerichtsstaat.”
63 Alcom Ltd. v Republic of Colombia (House of Lords, 12 April 1984). Here the House of Lords 
reaffirmed what the German Constitutional Court said that a bank account used by the State 
or an embassy to cover the  day-to-day expenses of  an embassy, clearly serves sovereign 
purposes and therefore is immune from enforcement measures. See also: Islamic Republic 
of Iran v Société Eurodif and others 82–12462 (French Cour de Cassation, 14 March 1984).
64 See in  this volume: A. Czaplińska, ‘The Preliminary Reference Procedure as an Instrument 
of Judicial Dialogue in the EU – the CEE Perspective’.
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1663/1365 not only referred to the  judgments of  the CJEU, but made a  critical 
examination of Luxembourg Court’s jurisprudence and entered into a  reasoned 
discussion with the CJEU. The Appellate Court decided not to apply to the CJEU 
under the procedure of preliminary ruling. 
The dispute in  the case at stake concerned copyrights and  the unlawful use 
of the plaintiff ’s song in election spot of one of candidates to the Polish Parliament, 
which was accessible through clickable Internet link.
The Warsaw Appellate Court differed with the  CJEU’s opinion expressed 
in C-466/12 Svensson,66 in which the Court of Justice held that the provision on 
a website of clickable links to works freely available on another website does not 
constitute an “act of communication to the public”, because there can be no ‘new 
public’ as every person having access to the Internet may view any websites avail-
able therein. The Warsaw Appellate Court, pointing to the judgment in C-306/05 
SGAE,67 concerning works communicated by means of  television sets installed 
in  hotel rooms, decided that the  CJEU in  C-466/12 Svenson has erroneous-
ly departed from its previous jurisprudence. According to the  Appellate Court, 
the websites are addressed to different public in different States, they are published 
in different languages and it cannot be said a priori that a clickable link to a web-
site does not break copyrights, because a given work has already been published 
on another website, so anyone could access it freely. The Warsaw Appellate Court 
also emphasized that the determination of an “act of communication to the pub-
lic” should always be based on a detailed analysis of a case also when it concerns 
clickable Internet links.68
Moreover, the Appellate Court showed an interesting approach to foreign juris-
dictions. The Court rejected the arguments of the defendant based in the rulings 
of the courts of the United States of America,69 stressing that the continental copy-
right system, so the one in Poland and in the EU, is very different from the Ameri-
can one. On this ground, the Court held that the US-courts’ decisions could not be 
taken into consideration when applying the relevant Polish and the EU laws. They 
65 Case I ACa 1663/13 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 7 May 2014).
66 C-466/12 Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v  Retriever Sverige AB 
(CJEU, 13 February 2014).
67 C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA (CJEU, 
7 February 2006).
68 “Rozumowanie Trybunału prowadzi bowiem do wniosku, że w przypadku wydania książki 
przez wydawcę inny wydawca, drukując i wydając za pośrednictwem tych samych kanałów 
dystrybucji taką samą książkę na takich samych warunkach, nie narusza monopolu autor-
skiego. Wniosek taki logicznie wypływa z rozumowania Trybunału, jednak nie może być on 
zaakceptowany jako prawidłowy zarówno na gruncie ustawy polskiej, jak i ustawodawstwa 
Unii Europejskiej. W  konsekwencji, w  opinii Sądu Apelacyjnego nie można  się w  tej części 
zgodzić z rozumowaniem Trybunału, a co za tym idzie – nie można przyjąć, iż w każdym wy-
padku umieszczanie odwołań (linków) nie narusza monopolu autorskiego.”
69 It is not indicated by the Warsaw Appellate Court which American judgments have been men-
tioned by the defendant.
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could only be used as an evidence on the evolution of  the copyright law in one 
of the most technically developed States in the world.70 
Another example are the decisions of the Polish Supreme Court, [in:] II CSK 
406/10,71 II CSK 541/1072 and  II CSK 326/10,73 all adopted on the 16 February 
2011 by the same judges. The cases concerned the determination of the court’s ju-
risdiction in insolvency proceedings, when a debtor runs business in two or more 
different States and the interpretation of Art. 3(1) and (2) of the Council Regula-
tion (EC) No. 1346/2000.74 The plaintiffs requested the opening of the insolven-
cy proceedings in Poland, whereas there was already an insolvency proceeding 
in progress against the same entrepreneur, instituted in France. In its reasoning 
the Supreme Court referred to the two orders of the High Court of Justice in Lon-
don delivered in Enron Directo SA,75 in which the High Court of  Justice devel-
oped the  theory of  mind of  management and  rebutted the  presumption based 
on the registered office. The  theory applied by the High Court in London was 
examined in detail and confronted by the Polish Supreme Court with the business 
activity theory, advanced by the  CJEU in  C-341/04 Eurofood.76 The  aim of  the 
Supreme Court was to discuss two different approaches to the question at hand 
and to choose the most proper one.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the business activity the-
ory, established by the  Court of  Justice. The  Supreme Court concluded, that 
the understanding of  the Council Regulation by virtue of  the theory of mind 
of  management would be too subjective and  it would lessen the  protection 
of the rights of creditors. Debtors could manipulate the prerequisites of estab-
lishing court’s jurisdiction by moving its seat to a State in which insolvency law 
is more favorable to them. At the end, the theory of mind of management could 
too easily lead to forum shopping. That is why, basing its view on teleological 
interpretation of the Regulation, the Supreme Court chose an approach that to 
a higher degree permits creditors for a real verification of circumstances justi-
fying jurisdiction. 
70 “Chybione są argumenty oparte na  orzeczeniach sądów Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki 
Północnej. Zasadniczo różny jest system prawa autorskiego kontynentalny – którego częścią 
jest tak Polska, jak i Unia Europejska – oraz system amerykański. Wskazane orzeczenia opie-
rają się na instytucji fair use, która nie może być porównywana do instytucji dozwolonego 
użytku. Nie mogą one dlatego stanowić podstawy do rozważań w zakresie stosowania pra-
wa w niniejszym postępowaniu, mogą jedynie dawać wskazówkę co do zmian w rozumie-
niu prawa zachodzącym na terenie jednego z najbardziej zaawansowanych technologicznie 
państw.”
71 Case II CSK 406/10 (Supreme Court, 16 February 2011).
72 Case II CSK 541/10 (Supreme Court, 16 February 2011).
73 Case II CSK 326/10 (Supreme Court, 16 February 2011).
74 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of  29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (2000]) 
O.J. L 160.
75 Enron Directo SA (High Court of Justice in London, 4 July 2002 and 10 December 2002).
76 C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (CJEU, 2 May 2006).
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The application of EU law may require not only references to the CJEU case 
law, but sometimes also to the decisions of the EU Member States’ courts. On one 
hand there are rulings in which Polish courts enter into a discussion with CJEU 
and foreign courts, by making detailed analysis and presenting their own conclu-
sions. On the other, there are also examples of  the decisions of ordinary courts 
in  which courts simply enumerate appropriate CJEU’s rulings to support their 
opinions, without much critical deliberation.77
2.4. Other Areas of Judicial Dialogue
Other instances, where ordinary courts deal with international law and discuss 
international or foreign courts’ decisions escape any categorization. These cases 
are lumped in this final part, as they do have one common feature, namely their 
sole purpose is to strengthen the courts’ own reasoning. 
The first case discussed concerns the application of the Convention on the Con-
tract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR Convention).78 In its 
judgment in I ACa 111/1379 the Szczecin Appellate Court referred to the decisions 
of the French Cour de Cassation80 and of the Belgian Koophandel te Antwerpen81 
in which the Courts underlined that to determine the carrier’s liability, the entire-
ty of circumstances has to be taken into account, also whether the robbery had 
been committed by a third person. The Szczecin Appellate Court pointed out that 
the verification, whether the carrier followed all obligations and standards binding 
upon them requires taking into consideration particular circumstances of a given 
case. A robbery might, but as well might not, be a reason for a release of the carrier 
from his liability. 
The Warsaw Appellate Court in  I  ACa 696/0382 and  the Szczecin Provincial 
Court in VIII Ga 31/1383 both cited the rulings of the Belgian Hof van Beroep te 
Antwerpen84 and  Tribunal de Commerce de Liège85 and  additionally the  Warsaw 
Appellate Court referred to the decision of the French Cour de Cassation.86 These 
77 The examples of decision of the Supreme Court’s which contain decorative dialogue are the 
following: II PK 207/12 (27 February 2013), IV CSK 202/13 (28 February 2014), III CZP 113/13 
(7 February 2014).
78 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR Conven-
tion) (19 May 1956).
79 Case I ACa 111/13 (Szczecin Appellate Court, 9 May 2013).
80 The Court referred to the particular case as: (French Cour de Cassation, 14 May 1992).
81 The Court referred to the particular case as: (Belgian Koophandel te Antwerpen, 3 March 1976).
82 Case I ACa 696/03 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 4 February 2003).
83 Case VIII Ga 31/13 (Szczecin Provincial Court, 8 March 2013).
84 The Court referred to the particular case as: (Belgian Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, 8 Novem-
ber 1989).
85 The Court referred to the particular case as: (Belgian Tribunal de Commerce de Liège, 27 June 
1985).
86 The Court referred to the particular case as: (French Cour de Cassation, 18 April 1989).
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judgments were mentioned to strengthen the Courts’ thesis that an entrepreneur 
acts as a forwarding agent only if this is stipulated expressly in the contract. In all 
other instances an entrepreneur is considered to be a carrier. 
In all the above-mentioned cases ordinary courts used foreign decisions to sup-
port their own reasoning and to demonstrate that their interpretation of various 
provisions of the CMR Convention is in line with the opinions of other courts. 
Ordinary courts use this technique especially if they deal with a  ground-
breaking interpretation or with new legal problems, e.g. in the field of  financial 
instruments. The example is the decision of the Bialystok Appellate Court87 that 
concerned the  contract of  the currency option. The  Appellate Court started its 
reasoning by comparing Polish and German regulations of  the currency option 
contracts. It found many similarities and decided to analyze in detail the German 
case law, especially in  the area of  the bank’s informative obligations towards its 
clients. The Appellate Court found German case-law relevant to interpret Polish 
regulations.88
87 Case I ACa 833/12 (Bialystok Appellate Court, 21 January 2013). The Court referred to Case XI 
ZR 33/10 (German Bundesgerichtshof, 22 March 2011).
88 “Dodać tylko należy, że z  wyroku niemieckiego Trybunału Federalnego z  dnia 22 mar-
ca 2011  roku (XI ZR 33/10), który dotyczy zakresu obowiązków informacyjnych i  lojalno-
ściowych banku wobec klienta w  związku z  zawieraniem transakcji pochodnych, wynika, 
że bank powinien odpytać klienta na okoliczność ryzyka inwestycyjnego, które jest w stanie 
podjąć – niezależnie od wykształcenia ekonomicznego klienta, wyjaśnić ryzyko ‘produktu’, 
tak by klient w zakresie tego ‘produktu’ miał zasadniczo ten sam poziom wiedzy co bank, 
uświadomić klientowi negatywną dla klienta, inicjalną wycenę produktu, gdyż taka wycena 
sama w sobie wskazuje na poważny konflikt interesów banku i klienta, uświadomić kliento-
wi konflikt interesów, jeżeli struktura ryzyka ‘produktu’ jest przez bank celowo przesunięta 
na niekorzyść klienta. Trybunał Federalny nie wiązał przy tym obowiązków informacyjnych 
banku ze  statusem konsumenckim klienta. Prowadzenie działalności gospodarczej przez 
klienta nie ma wpływu na  obowiązki informacyjne banku. Istotny dla  obowiązków infor-
macyjnych banku jest jedynie brak wystarczającej wiedzy klienta dla oceny ryzyk z transak-
cji na poziomie zasadniczo zbliżonym, w zakresie zawieranej transakcji, do wiedzy banku. 
Kwalifikacje zawodowe klienta nie mają zasadniczo znaczenia. Trybunał Federalny zwrócił 
uwagę, że doświadczenie zawodowe klienta musiałoby właściwie dotyczyć przygotowy-
wania i zawierania transakcji pochodnych, tak by klient niejako ‘od kuchni’ posiadł wiedzę 
na temat skutków konkretnej, zawieranej transakcji porównywalną z wiedzą banku. Ogólna 
wiedza na temat transakcji nie byłaby więc wystarczająca. Przyjęcie, że klient był zoriento-
wany w ryzykach wywoływanych przez transakcję tylko na tej podstawie, iż zawierał trans-
akcje w innym banku, jest nieuprawnione. Doświadczenie klienta uzasadniające odstąpie-
nie od wyczerpującego poinformowania o właściwościach i możliwych skutkach transakcji 
musiałoby dotyczyć takich samych transakcji, przy czym nie chodzi tylko o typ transakcji, 
czy ich podtyp. Spostrzeżenia Trybunału Federalnego znajdują zastosowanie do  realiów 
polskich, albowiem Trybunał ten rozstrzygał właściwie na  podstawie ogólnych zasad od-
powiedzialności odszkodowawczej ex contractu (§ 280 niemieckiego kodeksu cywilnego), 
a po części również na podstawie przepisów niemieckiej ustawy o obrocie papierami warto-
ściowymi (§ 31.1.2 niemieckiej ustawy o obrocie papierami wartościowymi), odpowiadają-
cych regulacjom art. 471 k.c. i § 6 ust. 1 rozporządzenia Ministra Finansów z dnia 28 grudnia 
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3. Examples of a Decorative Dialogue
We have to recall that fake or decorative dialogue means the one “pretending 
to refer to the case-law of other courts but in fact just decorating the reasoning by 
random references to inappropriately collected and inaptly analysed decisions.”89 
While Polish courts engage infrequently in the proper judicial dialogue with other 
jurisdictions, the decorative references seem to be more common.
As an example of a decorative dialogue of Polish ordinary courts we can point 
to the reference to the Human Rights Committee in a decision which concerned 
family law and the State’s obligation to respect one’s private and family life, as en-
shrined i.a. in Art. 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
2005 roku w sprawie trybu i warunków postępowania firm inwestycyjnych oraz banków po-
wierniczych (Dz. U. z 2006 roku Nr 2, poz. 8).”
“It must be added that it results from the  judgment of  the German Federal Tribunal 
of 22 March 2011 (XI ZR 33/10), which concerns the scope of information and loyalty obli-
gations of bank towards its clients in connection with contracts of derivate transactions, 
that a  bank should question its client on the  investment risk that the  client is  able to 
undertake –  regardless of  client’s economic education. The  bank should also explain 
the risk of a ‘product’, so that the client has the same level of knowledge of a ‘product’ as 
a bank itself, it should inform the client about a negative (from their stance), initial pric-
ing of a product, as this pricing itself shows a serious conflict of interests of bank and its 
client, inform client about the conflict of interests, if the structure of the ‘product’s’ risk 
is wilfully shifted by bank to the disadvantage of its client. The Federal Tribunal did not 
connect the information obligations of a bank with a consumer status of its client. Run-
ning a  business activity by a  client has no influence on bank’s information obligations. 
The crucial aspect for bank information obligations is the lack of sufficient client’s knowl-
edge on the evaluation of risks of transaction to the level fundamentally close to bank’s 
knowledge, as far as it concerns given transaction. Client’s professional skills are princi-
pally of no importance. The Federal Tribunal noticed, that client’s professional experience 
should be actually connected to preparation and conclusion of derivate transactions, so 
that the client had practical knowledge on the effects of a given transaction, comparable 
to the  bank’s knowledge. A  general knowledge on transaction is  not enough. Assuming 
that the client was knowledgeable of risks caused by transaction only on this ground, that 
client had contracts with other bank, lacks justification. A client’s experience, justifying 
resignation from exhausting information about properties and possible effects of trans-
action should concern exactly the same transactions, but it does not mean only the type 
or subtype of  it. The remarks of  the Federal Tribunal are applicable in Polish reality, as 
the Tribunal solved the case actually on the basis of general rules of liability for damages 
ex contractu (§ 280 of the German Civil Code), and partially on the basis of the German 
statute on securities trading (§ 31.1.2 of the German statute on securities trading), which 
correspond to Art. 471 of the Polish Civil Code and § 6(1) of the regulation of the Minis-
try of  Finance of  28  December 2005 on the  terms and  procedures for investment firms 
and trust banks (O.J. 2006.2.8).”
89 M. Górski, op. cit. (n. 8).
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(ICCPR).90 In its ruling in case II CKN 321/9991 the Supreme Court made only 
a general remark, that according to the HRC the prohibition of unlawful inter-
ference in  one’s private life means that no intrusion is  permissible, except for 
the situations strictly regulated by law. Nevertheless, the national legislation that 
regulates the interference of the State’s organs in the sphere covered by Art. 17 
ICCPR must comply with the  objectives and  terms of  the Covenant. The  Su-
preme Court did not indicate any specific decision of the Human Rights Com-
mittee. The sole aim of this general reference was to add value to its own reason-
ing. The Court additionally mentioned (briefly and generally) Art. 8 ECHR (the 
right to respect for private and family life) and the Polish Constitution (Art. 3192 
and Art. 4793) without indicating any decisions of  the ECtHR or of  the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal.
For example, at one instance the Polish Supreme Court referred to the judg-
ment of the International Court of Justice. In case V CSK 295/07,94 the Court dealt 
with the effects of the nationalization acts of Polish authorities of 2005 and the 
indemnization agreement between Poland and the United States of America.95 
Following the agreement concluded to solve the problems of the property left by 
American citizens after the II World War on the territory of Poland, the United 
States accepted the  sum of  40 000 000  USD in  full settlement and  discharge 
of all claims of nationals of  the United States against the Government of Po-
land because of the nationalization and other forms of taking over property by 
Poland. The  American citizens were supposed to address their claims before 
the US Government. If they accepted the damages, they had to renounce their 
property rights. Recently some of  them questioned the amount of  remunera-
tion obtained or claimed damages if they had not used the procedure offered 
by the US authorities. The case at stake was one of many similar before Polish 
courts. The Supreme Court referred to its previous case-law and the judgments 
of the Polish Constitutional Court on just compensation in nationalization cas-
es, and interestingly, also to the ICJ Barcelona Traction96 decision. The Supreme 
Court highlighted that although the  civilised nations are  obliged to protect 
private property, the  property right is  not of  an absolute character, it can be 
restricted by law, or even declined to an individual provided that a condition 
of just compensation is fulfilled. Regarding damages, the Court noted that there 
90 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
91 Case II CKN 321/99 (Supreme Court, 18 August 1999).
92 The principle of proportionality.
93 The right to respect for private and family life. 
94 Case V CSK 295/07 (Supreme Court, 12 December 2007).
95 Agreement on settlement of  claims of  United States Nationals between the  United States 
of America and Poland (16 July 1960).
96 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain) (ICJ, 24 July 1964).
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is no common international practice97 and only in this respect the Court cited 
Barcelona Traction, unfortunately without mentioning any specific paragraphs 
of the judgment.  In its decision the ICJ did not examine the merits of the case, 
the property rights claims nor made any statements concerning the acceptable 
level of protection of  this right. The dispute before the  ICJ was between Bel-
gium and Spain and it concerned the Spanish acts of nationalization, inter alia 
of the property of the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, 
whose property rights were infringed. The  main issue before the  ICJ was to 
determine which State may exercise the diplomatic protection. It appeared that 
it was not Belgium, that brought the case to the ICJ but Canada.98 The case was 
therefore dismissed.
4. Examples of a Failed Dialogue
Failed dialogue denotes such instance of a dialogue that misses “the opportu-
nity to refer to the case law of other courts at all where one should reasonably ex-
pect that such jurisprudence is presented.”99 There are way too many of examples 
97 “Na marginesie powyższych rozważań, należy jeszcze zwrócić uwagę, że ocena prawna aktów 
nacjonalizacji czy też wywłaszczenia jest wyjątkowo złożona i nie może ograniczyć się tylko 
do przepisów u.d.w. Należy oddzielić od siebie sam problem wpisu prawa własności Skarbu 
Państwa jako rezultatu nacjonalizacji mienia osób prywatnych od jego przesłanek w prawie 
wewnętrznym z jednej strony oraz aspektów prawnomiędzynarodowych odpowiedzialności 
odszkodowawczej państwa za  akt nacjonalizacji z  drugiej strony. Prawo własności nie jest 
prawem absolutnym, choć do ogólnych zasad prawa narodów cywilizowanych należy jego 
ochrona; nie ma także powszechnej praktyki międzynarodowej, gdy chodzi o zasady indem-
nizacji z tytułu wywłaszczeń (por. m.in. wyrok Międzynarodowego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości 
w sprawie Belgia przeciwko Hiszpanii – Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Zbiór 
Orzeczeń MTS 1970, s. 3 i n.). Jak podkreśla się zarówno w orzecznictwie Sądu Najwyższego 
(por. wyrok z dnia 23 września 2004 r., III CK 401/03, OSNC 2005 nr 7–8, poz. 148), jak i Trybu-
nału Konstytucyjnego (postanowienie z dnia 24 października 2000 r., SK 31/99, OTK-ZU 2000 
nr 7, poz. 262), przejęcie przez Skarb Państwa mienia obywateli innych państw następowało 
na podstawie szeregu aktów normatywnych, do których należy m.in. dekret z dnia 8 marca 
1946 r. o majątkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich (Dz. U. Nr 13, poz. 87 z późn. zm.) czy też 
tzw. dekrety nacjonalizacyjne. W ocenie Sądu Najwyższego w składzie rozpoznającym niniej-
szą sprawę, Układ rządowy pomiędzy USA a  PRL dotyczył nie tyle nabycia własności jako 
takiego, ile raczej zasad wypłaty odszkodowań za mienie przejęte zgodnie z prawem obowią-
zującym ówcześnie w Polsce.”
98 The seat of the company was located in Toronto, Canada, but it was connected to Belgium 
due to the fact that the company’s shareholders were Belgian nationals.
99 Górski M., op. cit. (n. 8).
Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak354
across the research conducted in this project. This section offers a short selection 
of such instances where courts’ ‘hands-off ’ approach may be considered as highly 
problematic.
4.1. Human Rights
There are many judgments concerning human rights, that are based solely on 
references to the  decisions of  Polish courts and  tribunals, without any reference 
to the rulings of  international bodies. The Wroclaw Appellate Court’s decision100 
on lustration proceedings may serve as an example. The Court carefully analysed 
the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Constitutional Tribunal. It examined 
the nature of lustration proceedings to determine whether it is of a criminal char-
acter. Although this issue was decided by the European Court of Human Rights 
in Moczulski v Poland,101 the Appellate Court hardly observed that both the Con-
stitutional Tribunal and the ECtHR consider this procedure to be a criminal one.102
4.2. International Customary Law
Even though, as it seems, the  judgments concerning State immunity permit 
Polish ordinary courts for a detailed analysis of the decisions of foreign jurisdic-
tions, the  opportunity is  not always seized. Case III CSK 293/07103  was brought 
to the Supreme Court by a Polish company against Turkey. The  former claimed 
compensation for a violation of its property right by unlawful seizure of company’s 
property on a basis of the regulation of the Turkish Ministry of Energy. The Court 
was aware that it had to apply customary international law and even underlined that 
it is authorized to do that under the Polish Constitution (i.a. Art. 9 which states that 
the Republic of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it). However, 
the Courts’ inquiry into international customary law on State immunity is highly 
disappointing. Since customary law is based on usus and opinio iuris, the court had 
to analyse also the case law of domestic and international courts.104 Instead of in-
voking domestic or international courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court mentioned 
100 Case II AKz 542/10 (Wroclaw Appellate Court, 26 October 2010).
101 Moczulski v Poland, App. no. 49974/08 (ECtHR, 19 November 2011).
102 “Zarówno Trybunał Konstytucyjny, jak też Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka (o  czym 
w sposób zdecydowany i jednoznaczny pisze Trybunał Konstytucyjny między innymi w wyro-
ku z dnia 11 maja 2007 r., sygn. akt K 2/07; zob. także wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 
4 lipca 2002 r., P 12/01, OTKA 2002, nr 4, poz. 50) wielokrotnie stwierdzały, że postępowanie 
lustracyjne ma charakter penalny. Świadczy o tym zarówno charakter czynu, za który spraw-
ca ponosi odpowiedzialność, charakter i dolegliwość sankcji za ten czyn przewidzianych, jak 
też reguły postępowania, w  toku którego stwierdzane jest ewentualne popełnienie czynu 
zarzucanego i orzekane są sankcje będące jego prawną konsekwencją.”
103 Case III CSK 293/07 (Supreme Court, 13 March 2008).
104 C. Mik, ‘Jus cogens in contemporary international law’ (2013) Polish Yearbook of Internation-
al Law XXXIII 50.
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its own rulings105 underlining that the principle of State sovereignty does not allow 
Polish courts to adjudicate cases against other States acting within their sovereign 
powers (acta iure imperii), however the  immunity does not cover non-sovereign 
acts (acta iure gestionis). The Court referred as well to the 1961 Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations106 and the European Convention on State Immunity,107 but 
only superfluously.
Comparable approach can be observed in the case which factual background 
was similar to Natoniewski cited above. It concerned compensation for the actions 
of German armed forces during the World War II. The plaintiff claimed compen-
sation from the Federal Republic of Germany for the alleged breach of his personal 
rights resulting from genetic damages caused by medical experiments carried out 
on his father as a prisoner of a German concentration camp. The Warsaw Provin-
cial Court in its decision in I C 862/07108 referred only to the judgment of the CJEU 
in C-292/05 Erini Lechouritou109 to emphasize that acts committed by the military 
belong to acta iure imperii acts of a State. They do not fall under the scope of civil 
matters and therefore a civil court cannot adjudicate them. The Provincial Court 
took no notice of other decisions of foreign or international courts that were cited 
in Natoniewski. Thus the Court missed the opportunity offered by the case to par-
ticipate in the judicial dialogue.
5. Conclusions
The presented research results demonstrate that except for the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
the Polish ordinary courts, albeit rarely, refer to the case law of the International 
Court of  Justice, the  Human Rights Committee and  the courts of  other States. 
The  reason why such rare references occur rarely lies in  the scope of  ordinary 
courts’ jurisdiction, which is focused on private law relations, based primarily on 
domestic law. The subject matter of the cases only sometimes may require taking 
into account international or foreign judgments. It happens especially if the case 
has some link to international law, such as human rights law, State immunity (cus-
tomary international law) or European Union law.
105 See Supreme Court cases: R 133/26 (2 March 1926); I C 1680/27 (10 February 1928); II C 413/37 
(31 August 1937); III PZP 9/90 (26 September 1990); I PKN 562/99 (11 January 2000); I CK 380/02 
(13 November 2003).
106 Convention on diplomatic relations (Vienna, 18 April 1961).
107 European Convention on State Immunity (Basel, 16 February 1972).
108 Case I C 862/07 (Warsaw Provincial Court, 3 September 2008).
109 Case C-292/05 Erini Lechouritou and others v Dimosio tis Demokratias tis Germanias (CJEU, 
15 February 2007).
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The most common practice of ordinary courts is to quote the decisions with-
out their detailed examination. The purpose of such citation is only to support 
the courts’ own reasoning. However, there were also exceptional rulings of a com-
parative and  critical character as the  judgment of  the Wroclaw District Court 
in X P 384/13 concerning the freedom of speech of an employee, the judgment 
on the obligation to remove a Sikh’s turban in certain circumstances as in Mr. S.P. 
(I CSK 439/13), the order of  the Warsaw Provincial Court in XXI Pz 95/14 on 
State immunity from the enforcement proceedings and the judgments of the Pol-
ish Supreme Court in Natoniewski (IV CSK 465/09), the decision of the Warsaw 
Appellate Court in  case concerning clickable links (I  ACa 1663/13), the  three 
cases concerning the notion of an entrepreneur’s seat for the purposes of the in-
solvency proceedings (II CSK 406/10, II CSK 541/10 and II CSK 326/10) and the 
judgment of  the Appellate Court in  Bialystok on contract of  currency option 
(I ACa 833/12). In  the above mentioned judgments the Polish courts not only 
merely cited the decisions of other jurisdictions, but they analysed them in detail 
and widely discussed, considering whether an analogous reasoning could be ap-
plied with respect to Polish law.
For a  judicial dialogue to have its proper discursive character, Polish courts 
should not only refer to the rulings of international and foreign courts, but their 
views should be noticed likewise by international or foreign courts. It  is worth 
noticing, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Natoniewski contributed to the in-
ternational dialogue on immunities of State, owing to its English translation pub-
lished in Polish Yearbook of International Law. It subsequently was discussed by 
the  International Court of  Justice in  Jurisdictional Immunities of  the State (Ger-
many v  Italy: Greece Intervening) and by the European Court of Human Rights 
in Jones and Others v the United Kingdom. One must conclude, therefore, that if 
Polish judges wish to have their part in a discussion on vital issues of international 
law, their decisions should be made accessible in foreign languages.
It must be appraised that some of the Polish ordinary courts try, however rare-
ly, to participate in  the dialogue with the courts of different jurisdictions. Even 
though the lack of knowledge of a given foreign language (for example a modern 
Greek) impedes the  judges from becoming acquainted with foreign judgments, 
they learn about the external jurisdictions with the help of the Ministry of Justice 
or, more often, legal publications in a specific field. It is obvious that the activity 
of scholars in the sphere of comparative law becomes thus more important. 
One of the examples where the scholarly work had an impact on a reasoning 
of  a  court was the  decision of  the Warsaw Appellate Court in  I  ACa 410/13,110 
where basing on the book of J. Rosén111 the Court quoted the ruling of the England 
110 Case I ACa 410/13 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 28 October 2013).
111 J. Rosén, Intellectual Property at the  Crossroads of  Trade (Edward Elgar 2012). The  Court 
wrote that it cited the text of Amanda Michaels from the mentioned book. It must be pointed 
out, however, that whilst Amanda Michaels is a known author in the field of the intellectual 
property law, she is not one of the authors of the invoked book.
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and  Wales High Court in  Jean Christian Perfumes Ltd and  Anor v  Thakrar.112 
The aim of this citation was to strengthen the opinion presented by the Warsaw 
Appellate Court in  the statement of  reasons. Another example is  the resolution 
of the Polish Supreme Court (I KZP 21/06113), in which the Court, citing the article 
of a scholar,114 referred to the two decisions of the High Court of Ireland in Fal-
lon115 and to opinion of the Belgian Cour de Cassation.116 The aim of these refer-
ences was the presentation of different approaches of national courts of other EU 
member States to the analyzed subject matter (European arrest warrant). Similarly, 
the above mentioned cases on the application of the CMR Convention117 referred 
to foreign decisions on the basis of their quoting in the articles in the journal Eu-
ropean Transport Law.
In the  judgment in  Natoniewski the  Polish Supreme Court got the  informa-
tion about the quoted international and foreign decisions and their content from 
the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, which was delivered on the basis of the Code 
of Civil Procedure.118 The other sources were the websites of the CJEU or the In-
ternational Civil Service Commission or Polish Professional software (e.g. LEX). 
The Court found some information in the legal literature, e.g. the Polish magazine 
Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego (Public Law Quarterly). 
The judicial dialogue of Polish ordinary courts suffers from several drawbacks. 
Usually the review of international or foreign decisions is superficial, as it is re-
stricted to a mere reference, therefore it can be classified as a decorative dialogue. 
Unfortunately, there are also some other factors or improper practices that hamper 
judicial dialogue. For ordinary courts the most noticeable problem is an adequate 
quoting of  international and  foreign decisions that sometimes produce humor-
ous results. The most remarkable example is naming the ECtHR as “the European 
112 Jean Christian Perfumes Ltd & Anor v Thakrar (t/a Brand Distributor or Brand Distributors Ltd) 
(England and Wales High Court, 27 May 2011). Unfortunately, the Warsaw Appellate Court 
cites the judgment with the inaccuracies. The England and Wales High Court is named “Eng-
lish High Court”, which is incorrect.
113 Case I KZP 21/06 (Supreme Court, 21 July 2006).
114 M. Hudzik, ‘Europejski nakaz aresztowania a  nieletni sprawcy czynów zabronionych 
– zagadnienia wybrane’ (2006) 8 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 22. What is interesting, is the 
fact that the article was published in August 2006, whereas the Court’s resolution is of July 
2006 and the Court indicated, that the official publication of the article was pending at 
that time.
115 Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v Fallon aka Micheal O Falluin (High Court of Ire-
land, 9 September 2005), Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v Fallon aka Micheal 
O  Falluin (High Court of  Ireland, 14 October 2005), The  Supreme Court inaccurately wrote 
the party’s name (Falkon instead of Falluin). 
116 Case P.05.0065.N (Belgian Cour de Cassation, 25 January 2005).
117 Case I ACa 111/13 (Szczecin Appellate Court, 9 May 2013), Case I ACa 696/03 (Warsaw Appel-
late Court, 4 February 2003), Case VIII Ga 31/13 (Szczecin Provincial Court, 8 March 2013).
118 Art. 1143(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: “A court ex officio determines and applies 
proper foreign law. A court may ask the Minister of Justice for the  information on the text 
of this law and for the explanation of foreign judicial practice.”
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Court of Human Rights in S.” where ‘S.’ stands for ‘Strasbourg’ or “the Court of Jus-
tice in L.” with ‘L.’ meaning ‘Luxembourg’.119 The citation often lacks names of par-
ties, dates of judgments or case numbers.120 These inaccuracies are easy to over-
come; nevertheless, they may clearly hamper the judicial discourse.
119 “Wprawdzie w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w S. oraz Sądu Naj-
wyższego, język i forma wypowiedzi prasowych podlegają ochronie, ale jednak w granicach 
prawa do czci tak jak swoboda wypowiedzi”, [in:] Case I ACa 931/14 (Lodz Appellate Court, 
30 December 2014). “Orzecznictwo Europejskiego Trybunału w  S.”, [in:] Case I  ACa 617/13 
(Bialystok Appellate Court, 20 December 2013).
120 “M.A. N., C. i  inni przeciwko Polsce –  decyzja ETPC z  dnia 14 maja 2013  r., skarga nr  […] 
(w:) M.A. N., Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka. Wybór orzeczeń 2013, LEX/el., 2014”, [in:] 
III AUa 21/14 (Szczecin Appellate Court, 23 September 2014); “orzeczenie z dnia 26 kwiet-
nia 1979 r. w sprawie […] v. Wielka Brytania (I), skarga […], LEX nr 80817; orzeczenie z dnia 
23 maja 1991 r. w sprawie O. v. Austria, skarga […], LEX nr 81177; orzeczenie z dnia 8 lipca 
1986  r. w  sprawie L. v. Austria, skarga […], LEX nr  81012”, [in:] I  ACa 662/12 (Lodz Appel-
late Court, 1  October 2012); “Jak wskazał Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka w  wyroku 
z dnia 19 kwietnia 2001 r. (P. przeciwko Grecji, sprawa 28524/95)”, [in:] I ACa 966/12 (Warsaw 
Appellate Court, 31 January 2013); “Pozostaje ona zatem w wyraźnej opozycji do wskazań 
zawartych w uzasadnieniu w wyroku ETPCz z dnia 10 maja 2011 r. (nr skargi […])”, [in:] II AKa 
185/14 (Bialystok Appellate Court, 18 September 2014); “W żadnym przeto wypadku wyrok 
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka z 14 czerwca 2011 r. – sprawa M. G. przeciwko Pol-
sce, skarga nr  […] nie mógł mieć precedensowego charakteru w  niniejszej sprawie”, [in:] 
V ACa 535/12 (Katowice Appellate Court, 13 February 2014); “Dla rozstrzygnięcia omawia-
nego zagadnienia istotne znaczenie ma też wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka 
z 2 marca 2010 r., nr 13102, P. K. przeciwko Polsce, w którym podkreślono”, [in:] I ACa 40/14 
(Warsaw Appellate Court, 26 June 2014); “Na tle tej dyrektywy, Trybunał Sprawiedliwości 
w sprawie C-388/07 rozpoznał kilka pytań prejudycjalnych w przedmiocie wykładni dyrek-
tywy”, [in:] IV IP 300/09 (Wroclaw Provincial Court, 16 July 2010); “Sprawa mieści się więc 
w pojęciu sprawy cywilnej i handlowej, rozumianej w sposób ugruntowany w orzecznictwie 
Trybunału Sprawiedliwości (por. np.  wyrok ETS z  dnia 14 listopada 2002  r., C-271/00 Slg. 
2002, I-10489)”, [in:] IV CSK 202/13 (Supreme Court, 28 February 2014); “Także Trybunał 
Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej w wyroku z dnia 19 grudnia 2012 r. wydanym w sprawie 
prejudycjalnej A. e. A. (C-325/11)”, [in:] I ACz 1479/13 (Bialystok Appellate Court, 5 December 
2013); “porównaj między innymi wyroki ETS z dnia 11 lipca 2008 r. C-195/08 PPU, Dz. Urz. 
UE, C-223 z  dnia 30 sierpnia 2008  r. i  z  dnia 22 grudnia 2010  r., C-491/10, PPU, Dz. U. UE, 
C-2011.63/23 z dnia 26 lutego 2011 r. i z dnia 22 grudnia 2010 r., C-497/10, PPU, Dz. U. UE, 
C-2011.55.17 z  dnia 19 lutego 2011 r.”, [in:] I  CSK 426/14 (Supreme Court, 17 September 
2014). It is worth noticing, that the ‘PPUs’ used in all of the cases are not the names of the 
parties to the proceedings, but they are a shortcut for ‘preliminary ruling’ (pytanie prejudy-
cjalne). “W wyroku ETS z dnia 13 grudnia 2007 r. wydanym w trybie prejudycjalnym rozstrzy-
gnięto bowiem, że…”, [in:] I ACz 186/12 (Katowice Appellate Court, 6 March 2012); “tak m.in. 
wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości z 10 kwietnia 1984 r. w sprawie 14/83 von C., pkt 26; wyrok 
z 13 listopada 1990 r. w sprawie C-106/89 M., pkt 8; wyrok z 5 października 2004 r. w połą-
czonych sprawach C-397/01 do C-403/01 P. i in., pkt 113 i 115”, [in:] I ACa 1166/13 (Warsaw 
Appellate Court, 11 March 2014). It is worth noticing that “wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości 
z 10 kwietnia 1984 r. w sprawie 14/83 von C.” means the “case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann 
v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (CJEU, 10 April 1984)”, which is a very well-known and recogni-
zable judgment of the CJEU.
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